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Manuel Prado and wartime politics
In 1941, with the world already engulfed in World War II, President Prado [1939-1945] declares that Peru will take part in a dynamic neutrality, which “means, to the contrary, the mobilization of activities, efforts, and energies to sustain and preserve, decorously, the invaluable treasure that is peace.” Not any kind of peace, but rather peace in the Americas, thus becoming an ally of continental interests1.
That same year, a decree bans the circulation of leaflets taking sides for the warring countries, measure that could be interpreted as well-intentioned and on the side of neutrality – conveniently allied to continental interests – but that in truth was part of a pact ratified by government representatives in Havana in 19282.
The following year, after the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place, Prado recalls his conduct on that occasion, remembering his indignation at the incident as a result of which “were created the appropriate measures to protect the country’s vital interests and the areas that, due to the quality of their production, could become targets of acts of sabotage. It was decreed the freezing of funds owned by Japanese residing in Peru, thus establishing that the Banking Agency would control all their financial operations and that the country’s custom offices would ban the circulation of goods of Japanese origin. Additionally, the export of certain strategic goods, whether domestic or foreign, was forbidden, while freedom of movement became restricted for the Japanese within the national territory3.”
Prado not only reaffirms those measures, but also states that “as a measure of elementary precaution, the government has invited a certain number of citizens from the Axis powers to leave the country because it has been confirmed that they had pursued – in a clandestine manner and by way of methods harmful to the security of the Republic and to the defense of the continent – an anti-democratic political campaign that had been forbidden last year. Last April and June, they left for the United States4.” And that’s how it happened. Prado later told the international press that some Nikkei and German immigrants had planned a series of anti-Semitic attacks on New Year’s Eve5.
At that point, one can clearly see the chasm separating the Peruvian government from citizens of German, Italian, and Japanese ancestry living in Peru – years after the diplomatic and official split. The aforementioned measures are then speedily put in place; some of them, prematurely.
The figures are unanimous6: between 2,000 and 2,300 Nikkei were deported from Latin America to the United States, 1,771 of those from Peru. Their destinations were the relocation camps, mostly in the southern areas of the country, in California and Texas (Manzanar, Crystal City, Seagoville).
Regarding this fact, it is important to emphasize that “relocation camps” is the moniker given to those camps where German, Italian, and Japanese families were interned in the United States during World War II. Some authors call them “concentration camps,” but they also make reference to the “Japanese holocaust,” which can be considered a tendentious and victimizing exaggeration.
According to what Prado had decreed – and we have reproduced above a direct quote (so that there’s no room for errors of interpretation) – the Nikkei citizens who would have been subject to deportations were those considered dangerous for the maintenance of the well-being of Peruvian society; in other words, those who spread pro-Axis propaganda, those suspected of being secret agents for their respective governments, and all those who failed to abide by the cannons of legal and prudent conduct demanded by the Peruvian government.
In 1940, the Department of Naturalization and Immigration was created, thus allowing the State not only to triple between 1939 and 1941 the collection of taxes from foreigners living in Peru7, but also to obtain a more accurate data on the population in its territory and the activities to which they were devoted. Also in 1940 a census was performed, and although certain data was exaggerated (due to a lack of knowledge of the exact number of inhabitants in the Amazon8), “racial” profiling was included in order to find out the actual number of whites, mestizos, Indians, blacks, and members of the yellow race9.
In addition to the mathematical precision provided by figures and statistics, there was an objective necessity – according to a comprehensible logic – for the deportation of civilians to the United States. It wasn’t solely because they were considered dangerous agents in the Latin American countries from where they were expelled, but also because the United States needed “exchange agents”; in other words, that country needed to rescue its war prisoners held in enemy territories.
Therefore, it is highly possible that many of the deportees – even though they had been school professors or directors (such as the Ogawa couple), or presidents of the Association (such as Gabe), or merely traders (such as Higashide) – didn’t have any sort of connection with the ideology espoused by the Japanese Empire. In fact, in many cases, they had left their country precisely to escape the war, so as to create a peaceful life away from the problems of the imperial expansionism during which, it should be noted, the least beneficiaries were the peasants, who were usually used as cannon fodder.
Why?
In Japan, people are increasingly, reluctantly aware that their country did wrong during World War II. But they prefer to focus on what they see as the wrong done to them. In a speech to foreign correspondents in Tokyo last week, the mayor of Nagasaki equated the A-bomb attacks with Hitler’s slaughter of the Jews (…) ignoring the fact that the Jews did nothing to deserve what happened to them10
This important question has a very complex answer, which must be reached from different viewpoints. One can’t simply accuse the Peruvian government of being xenophobic, the Japanese community of being victimized, the American government of being cruel, the Peruvian society of being envious, and the immigrants of being ingrates.
On the one hand, it is undeniable that Peruvian society had a certain repulsion for the community, fed by the aforementioned reasons, in addition to the fact that the Japanese were a group that always gave the impression of forming a very closed circle, which on top of it all had – and has – its own press and exclusive associations. However, as frequently happens and has already happened, eventually all groups were joined together, becoming part of the maremagnum that constitutes this diverse country. Even though the subject of discrimination always leads to serious discussions, that attitude is increasingly condemned socially11. For that reason, the citizens’ repulsion could not have been enough justification for the deportation of the Nikkei wherever they were. Even in 1940 and 1941, ads for Japanese businesses such as Casa Ychikawa, T. Kurotobi, Inc., Matsubayashi and Ikeda Auto Parts Manufacturing, Antonio Matzumoto’s Market, R. Varese Typography, Colégio Cultural Peruano [Peruvian Cultural School], managed by the brothers Haro, found space in youth and university dailies12. What was most noticeable in those years was the real preoccupation with the conflict with Ecuador. Yet, the same dailies that can be found a year later don’t mention that war even tangentially; by then, the ads have already disappeared.
On the other hand, although it is highly probable that they were less numerous than those who were actually deported, there is the likelihood that in Peru existed some group or other that worked in the shadows – not necessarily with the intent of attacking or invading the country, but instead aiming to create a strategic position on the American side of the Pacific. After all, Peru has an extensive coastline along the Pacific Ocean and has the second largest population of Japanese origin in South America [after Brazil], which could make things easier.
What is known is that outside that hypothetical plan, which doesn’t belong to history, we can notice in the American press of that period an effort to show that the American continent formed one single bloc, including all Latin-American nations with a large number of citizens originating from the Axis countries13.
Keeping in mind the measures adopted jointly by Latin-American governments, we can establish that President Prado’s decisions were not reached at the last minute; instead, they were the result of something bigger. It is also important to remember that the alliances he succeeded in forming so as to reach the presidency were motivated by anti-fascist sentiment, even though fascism, as Ciccarelli has remarked, wasn’t really possible in Peru. Either way, that fear was real, having its utmost expression when the Communist Party supported Prado’s candidacy.
Therefore, those weren’t measures implemented by a mere puppet; Peru’s foreign policy prior to his government had already been leaning increasingly against fascism. Within this context, the beginning of World War II and the uniform tendency of Latin-American countries to ally themselves with the United States fit like a glove, thus leading to the measures discussed above. Despite all that, it is true that among the Axis nations Japan had the worst affected community; it is also true that it was not a social segment with as much power as the Italian or that it was less numerous than the German.
It is also important to understand the unusual context affecting the Prado government, including the 1940 earthquake14, the conflict with Ecuador (which led to passionate reactions), and the economy that needed to be sustained – and which kept deteriorating. A known fact is the affinity the American government had for President Prado, in addition to, according to information found in the American press of the period, the US government’s decision to buy two-thirds of Peru’s cotton production15 and to support its policy of subsidies. In politics, in times of crisis, any assistance is always welcome no matter its origin.
Pending tasks
In this study we’ve tried to understand the various factors that led the Prado government to deport Nikkei to the United States, as well as to present a synopsis of what the Peruvian historiography has had to say about the Japanese society and community during those years.
It is important to integrate both subjects so that one can more clearly understand what happened with the community during those years; a community that, as a result of the global context of that time, found itself violently fragmented despite having begun to take part in the curious mosaic that makes up our Peruvian society.
By clarifying what happened and by trying to understand the reasons for it, this study expounds the importance of the fact that Prado caved in to the needs of the United States, which places Peru on the first plane of this scenario. His government’s deportation of more than 80% of the Nikkei to relocation camps can be seen – except in regard to the distances involved – as akin to Poland’s handing its Jews to the Nazis.
Therefore, we can say that Peruvian historiography in regard to that period is lacking, for it fails to include the international context in its analysis of the Prado government and the importance of international relations in such a vital and complex context.
Still, there remains pending an awareness both from the civil society and the State not only in regard to the scope of this history shared with other countries and citizens, but also when it comes to reflecting on an incident of that kind. It would be one more chance to heal those little wounds that exist in our collective memory; a memory without which our country would keep its identity in the shadows.
Notes:
1. PRADO, Manuel. Mensaje presentado al Congreso por el Señor Doctor Don Manuel Prado Presidente Constitucional de la República. (Message Presented to Congress by the Señor Doctor Don Manuel Prado, Constitutional President of the Republic) Lima: 1941. p.9.
2. Ibid. p. 14.
3. PRADO, Manuel. Mensaje presentado al Congreso por el Señor Doctor Don Manuel Prado Presidente Constitucional de la República. (Message Presented to Congress by the Señor Doctor Don Manuel Prado, Constitutional President of the Republic) Lima: 1942. p.17.
4. Ibid. p. 18.
5. "Crisis Delayed" Time Magazine January 24, 1944.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,803044,00.html
6. YOUNG, Michael. "Texas camps were home to Latin American Japanese internees during WWII" en The Dallas Morning News. Texas, 23 mayo 1999, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Japanese Latin Americans to Receive Compensation for Internment During World War II. http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/June/276.htm.html, BECERRA, Xavier y LUNGREN, Dan. The Original Crystal City. http://www.aiipowmia.com/inter27/in240207crystalcity.html, CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE: Redress Now For Japanese Latin American Internees! http://www.campaignforjusticejla.org/history/index.html.
Other authors, such as Amelia Morimoto and Mary Fukumoto, raise the figures to 3,000.
7. PRADO, Manuel. Mensaje presentado al Congreso por el Señor Doctor Don Manuel Prado Presidente Constitucional de la República. (Message Presented to Congress by the Señor Doctor Don Manuel Prado, Constitutional President of the Republic) Lima: 1942. p.34.
8. CONTRERAS, Carlos and CUETO, Marcos. Op. Cit. p. 275.
9. This was the color palette officially provided by the census. Its mention in this text is in no way intended to be derogatory.
10. WATSON, Russell and TAKAYAMA, Hideko (in Tokyo) e SPARKMAN, Robin (in New York). "Crimes and Misdemeanors Japan: Reluctant remembrance of wartime guilt" Newsweek, Mar. 1995 Vol 125 issue 13, p.43.
11. Though hardly the most we can hope for, it must considered a form of progress.
12. Diario Baluarte. March 1940, Semanario Cascabel. May 1941.
13. "Hunting a Nazi". Time Magazine. September 1, 1941.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,849464-2,00.html
"EDB swings into action" Time Magazine. December 15, 1941.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772872,00.html
"Crisis Delayed" Time Magazine. January 24, 1944.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,803044,00.html
14. Event that many believed was a form of divine punishment because it took place seven days after burglaries and other acts committed against the community’s establishments and schools.
15. "Toward a cotton pool" Time Magazine. May 1942.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,777785,00.html
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＊This article has been published through an agreement between the Japanese Peruvian Association (APJ) and the Discover Nikkei Project. This article was originally published in APJ’s magazine Kaikan Informativo, issue 39, December 2008.
© 2008 Yukyko Takahashi Martínez
