From DiscoverNikkei.org

Kachigumi / Makegumi

In 1942, a "Brazilianization" campaign led to intense anti-Japanese propaganda that often targeted immigrants and their descendants, who numbered over a half million. While the official legislation ended at the end of World War II, the widespread social prejudice led many Japanese and Nikkei to strike back against the public order by becoming what appeared to be increasingly "Japanese." The most open manifestation came in the formation of secret societies that insisted Japan had won the war. What makes these groups particularly interesting is that they claimed over 100,000 members and that their influence exploded AFTER World War II ended. How, in 1946, 1947 and 1948, could 100,000 literate people who had lived all or most of their lives in Brazil believe that Japan had won the war? The technical reason is that the idea of Japan's defeat had little resonance among immigrants since the Japanese-language media was banned and few in rural areas had access to Brazilian newspapers or newsreels.1 Of course, one did not have to "believe" that Japan had won the war to support these societies in their demand for a space for Japanese-Brazilian ethnicity. Secret societies were a counter-attack on the way national identity was defined during a period of political transition and ostensible democracy after Vargas' Estado Nôvo was toppled.

The most powerful of the secret societies was the Shindo Renmei (Way of the Subjects of the Emperor's League) which emerged in late 1945. The society's initial goals were to maintain a permanent Japanized space in Brazil through the preservation of language, culture and religion among Nikkei and the re-establishment of Japanese schools.2 What the Shindo Renmei did not promote was a return to Japan. Home was considered Brazil and by the end of 1945 the group had 50,000 members who believed, or claimed to believe, that Japan had won the war.3 The group's circulars and secret newspapers found a willing audience among the many immigrants educated to believe in Japan's superiority and invincibility. News of Japan's defeat was dismissed as nothing more than U.S. propaganda and just a week after Emperor Hirohito broadcast his surrender message, the Shindo Renmei released its own statement:

"Emperor Hirohito has been forced to abdicate in favor of a Regent because he accepted the conditions imposed by the Potsdam Declaration. The Imperial combined fleet has been given the order for immediate action, and in a furious battle in Okinawan waters the Japanese Navy and Air Force destroyed about four hundred Allied warships, thus deciding the course of the war. The Japanese employed for the first time their secret weapon, the 'High Frequency Bomb.' Only one of the bombs killed more than one hundred thousand American soldiers on Okinawa. [This led to the] 'unconditional surrender of the Allies (and) the landing of Japanese expeditionary forces in Siberia and the United States.'"4

The "news" spread quickly and by mid-1946 the Shindo Renmei claimed 130,000 members and its propaganda included altered photos of President Truman bowing to Emperor Hirohito and "press" reports of Japanese troops landing in San Francisco and marching towards New York.5 When a group of prominent Japanese circulated the actual surrender documents they were accused of being traitors and the community quickly divided into two camps: the kachigumi (victorist) and makegumi (defeatist) who called themselves esclarecidos in Portuguese (clear-headed or enlightened).6

What brought the Shindo Renmei to the attention of the wider public was a series of killings by "fanatical young people" recruited to assassinate those who spoke against the movement. The murders began in early March 1946 and by September, sixteen esclarecidos were assassinated, including the head of the Japanese section of Sweden's Consulate General and an ex-Japanese army colonel who had headed São Paulo's largest agricultural cooperative. Hundreds of people received death threats and numerous silk, cotton and mint farmers found their homes and fields destroyed.7 The killings created a press sensation when captured Shindo Renmei members insisted that "Japan did not lose the war. As long as there is one Japanese on earth, even if he is the last, Japan will never surrender."8 The murders, however, were only superficially about Japan winning the war since the Shindo Renmei was really about guaranteeing Nikkei space in the Brazilian nation. In the convoluted post-war years Shindo Renmei members used "loyalty" to Japan to insure a place in Brazil.

In spite of numerous arrests and the Brazilian government's insistence that Japan had lost the war, the Shindo Renmei continued to grow in strength. Finally, in July 1946, one of Brazil's most powerful politicians, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, invited police, military officials, diplomats from the Swedish Legation, and Shindo Renmei members, including those in jail, to a meeting. The encounter was all about expanding national identity to include Nikkei. Imagine the scene--one of the two or three most important politicos in Brazil taking 400 people out of jail, putting them in the same room with the leaders of a secret society claiming 130,000 members and calling them "the most important part of the Brazilian population." Those in the audience understood the rules of the game and Sachiko Omasa laid out the deal: "We Japanese do not believe...in Japan's defeat. If Your Excellency wants to end the disputes and terrorist acts, begin by spreading word of Japan's victory and order that all false propaganda about defeat be stopped."9

Macedo Soares could have simply dismissed the Shindo Renmei as a bunch of lunatics and let them go on killing each other. He did nothing of the sort. Instead, sure that Brazil's continued economic growth could only take place if Japanese colonies were producing at full strength, he prohibited newspapers from publishing news of Japan's defeat and ordered the term "unconditional surrender" taken out of all official communications. The killings stopped and large scale Nikkei efforts to raise funds for Japanese victims of the war helped to marginalize the extreme "victorist" groups. The last gasp came in early 1950 when Japanese Olympic swimming champion Masanori Yusa arrived in Brazil with his team the "Flying Fish." For Nikkei this event would help cement their place as hyphenated Brazilians. An exhibition match at the Pacaembu Stadium (a major futebol arena) was a sell-out and included music by the State Military Police Band and the presence of the Governor of São Paulo. But during an interview, members of the Flying Fish expressed shock when presented with the idea that Japan had won the war. As a result the Shindo Renmei began poster campaigns claiming the group were Koreans masquerading as Japanese.10 The suggestion was so ludicrous that public support for the Shindo Renmei dried up overnight. The secret societies had ended, in large part because a space, albeit a contested one, for Nikkei had emerged in post-war Brazil.

(Excerpt from a paper "Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil" by Jeffrey Lesser. An in depth examination of this subject can be found in Lesser's book of the same title, "Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil" (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).

Note 1: Y. Kumusaka and H. Saito, "Kachigumi: A Collective Delusion Among the Japanese and their Descendants in Brazil." Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 15:2 (April, 1970), 169. Pp. 167-175.

Note 2: Hekisui Yoshii, "Gokuchû Kaiko-roku" (Memories from Prison), Manuscript, 1948. Cited in translation by Susumu Miyao and José Yamashiro, "A Comunidade Nipônica no Período da Guerra" in Comissão de Elaboração da Histôria dos 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil, Uma Epopéia oderna: 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 1992), 262. Translation of Shindo Renmei documents can be found in "Perigosa Atividade Niponica em São Paulo" Arquivos da Polícia Civil de São Paulo 8:2 (1944), 567-571. Emilio Willems and Hiroshi Saito, "Shindo Renmei: Um problema de Aculturação," Sociologia 9 (1947), 143. Two excellent studies of the Shindo Renmei and similar movements are Takashi Maeyama, "Ethnicity, Secret Societies and Associations: The Japanese in Brazil," Comparative Studies in Societv and History15 (April, 1970), 589-610 and Susumu Miyao and José Yamashiro, "A Comunidade Enfrenta um Caos sem Precedentes" in Comissão de Elaboração da Histôria dos 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil, Uma Epopéia Moderna: 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 1992), 265-360.

Note 3: See translation of Shindo Renmei objectives and statutes in report of João André Dias Paredes to Major Antonio Pereira Lira (State Police Chief, Paraná), 30 April 1949. Secretaria de Estado de Segurança Pública, Departamento da Polícia Civil, Divisão de Segurança e Informações. No. 1971- Sociedade Terrorista Japonesa Arquivo Público Paraná, Curitiba. Mário Botelho de Miranda, Shindo Remmei: terrorismo e extorsão (São Paulo: Edi,ção Saraiva, 1948), 11. James L. Tigner, "The Okinawans in Latin America." Scientific Investigations in the Ryuku Island (SIRI) Report #7. Washington, D.C.: Pacific Science - Board National Research Council, Department of Army, 1954), 42.

Note 4: Article by José Yamashiro in Paulista Shinhun 29 April 1947. Translated and reprinted in James L. Tigner, "The Okinawans in Latin America." Scientific Investigations in the Ryuku Island (SIRI) Report #7. Washington, D.C.: Pacific Science Board - National Research Council, Department of Army, 1954), 44.

Note 5: O Estado de São Paulo 26 March 1946; Correio da Manhã 6 April 1946; A Noite (Rio de Janeiro) 13 April 1946. Herculano Neves, O processo da "Shindo-Renmei" e demais associações secretas japonesas. (São Paulo: np, 1960), 97, 124.

Note 6: Tomoo Handa, O Imigrante Japonês: Histôra de Sua Vida no Brasil. (São Paulo: T.A. Queiroz: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasilieros, 1987), 651-655.

Note 7: O Dia 6 April 1946 and 4 May 1946, Mário Botelho de Miranda, Shindo Renmei: terrorismo e extorsão (São Paulo: Edi,ção Saraiva, 1948), 160-161. Tomoo Handa, O Imigrante Japonês: História de Sua Vida no Brasil. (São Paulo: T.A. Queiroz: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasilieros, 1987), 660. James L. Tigner, "The Okinawans in Latin America." Scientific Investigations in the Ryuku Island (SIRI) Report #7. Washington, D.C.: Pacific Science Board - National Research Council, Department of Army, 1954), 45.

Note 8: Tomoo Handa O Imigrante Japonês: História de Sua Vida no Brasil. (São Paulo: T.A. Queiroz: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasilieros, 1987), 673.

Note 9: Information on the meeting from: A Gazeta 20 July 1946, Jornal de São Paulo 20 July 1946, Susumu Miyao and José Yamashiro, "A Comunidade Enfrenta um Caos sem Precedentes" in Comissão de Elaboração da História dos 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil, Uma Epopéia Moderna: 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 1992), 300-305.

Note 10: Folha da Noite (SP) 21 March 1950. Tomoo Handa, O Imigrante Japones: Historia de Sua Vida no Brasil. (São Paulo: T.A. Queiroz: Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasilieros, 1987), 746-752.


External Links

Video documentary by Helmut Breineder and Celinha Fink about the conflict between factions of the Japanese population in Brazil at the end of World War II.
Retrieved from "http://www.discovernikkei.org/wiki/index.php/Kachigumi_/_Makegumi"
Personal tools